Criminal Law - Contradictory Statements Under Oath as Grounds for Perjury in the Federal Courts by Adams, Richard M., S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 53 Issue 8 
1955 
Criminal Law - Contradictory Statements Under Oath as Grounds 
for Perjury in the Federal Courts 
Richard M. Adams S.Ed. 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Evidence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard M. Adams S.Ed., Criminal Law - Contradictory Statements Under Oath as Grounds for Perjury in 
the Federal Courts, 53 MICH. L. REV. 1165 (1955). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol53/iss8/9 
 
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an 
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please 
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1955] COMMENTS 1165 
CRIMINAL LAw-CoNTRADICTORY STATEMENTS UNDER OATH AS 
GROUNDS FOR PERJURY IN THE FEDERAL CouRTs-Perjury has fre-
quently been described as one of the more difficult convictions to 
obtain,1 and the truth of this saying is no better illustrated than in 
the case of Harvey Matusow. During the two years in which ex-
Communist Matusow served as a professional government witness, 
he accused 180 or more persons as being members of the Commu-
nist Party or Communist sympathizers.2 This same witness has now 
described himself as a "habitual and perpetual liar" and has publicly 
admitted that all of his previous testimony was false.3 On the strength 
of this recantation, motions were filed for a new trial in two cases4 
where Matusow' s testimony had played a key role in gaining a con-
viction for the government. In both instances, Matusow furnished 
sworn affidavits and took the witness stand to assert under oath that 
his former sworn testimony was a mere fabrication. In the Jencks case 
the motion was dismissed and Matusow was sentenced to three years 
1 7 V.AND. L. RBv. 272 (1954); McClintock, "What Happens To Perjurers," 24 
MINN. L. RBv. 727 (1940); Hibschman, "'You Do Solemnly Swear!' Or that Perjury 
Problem," 24 J. CRIM. L . .AND CmM. 901 (1934). 
2 Matusow allegedly left the party in January 1951. From 1952 through 1954 he 
served as a government witness in several federal prosecutions involving Communism and 
appeared before numerous government agencies, including both the House Un-American 
Activities Committee and the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. The 
reported tabulations on the number of people that he accused during this period as being 
in association with Communism has run from 180 [N.Y. TIMEs, city ed., Feb. 4, 1955, p. 
8] to 280 [N.Y. T1MI!s, March 20, 1955, §4, p. 2]. 
3 Matusow so described himself before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on In-
vestigations on Feb. 21, 1955. N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 22, 1955, p. 8. 
4 In 1952, Matusow testified as a key government witness in the trial of 13 second-
string Communist leaders who were convicted of violating the Smith Act. United States 
v. Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, (2d Cir. 1954) 216 F. (2d) 354. In 1953, he also served as 
a witness in the trial of Clinton E. Jencks, International Representative of the Interna-
tional Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, who was convicted of willfully filing a 
false non-Communist affidavit with the National Labor Relations Board in violation of 
the Taft-Hartley Act. United States v. Jencks, (D.C. Tex. 1954) Crim. No. 54013. 
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imprisonment for contempt of court.5 The other motion has yet to be 
decided. On the surface this would seem to be an open and shut case 
of perjury, but the fact that to this date no indictment has been made 
points up one of the strangest paradoxes of the criminal law.6 
Under both the common law7 0 and the Federal Code,8 Matusow 
has satisfied all the substantive elements of perjury. By his own 
admission, his lying was willful. The sworn affidavits or testimony on 
the witness stand at the Jencks and Flynn trials and the contrary testi-
mony in the hearings for new trials, not to mention his numerous ap-
pearances before congressional investigating committees, are statements 
under oath before authorized tribunals. Though some courts may 
allow the witness to purge himself of the crime by recantation,9 the 
perjury is generally deemed complete unless the correction is made im-
mediately and as part of the same examination.10 Nor could Matusow 
obtain any protection from the "self-incrimination" clause of the Fifth 
5 In sentencing Matusow for contempt, the court concluded that the recantation had 
been concocted merely as a scheme to publicize his book, note 53 infra. 
1 6 A similar case has recently developed in hearings for a license renewal of a Penn-
sylvania radio station before the Federal Communications Commission. Two government 
witnesses, who had accused the owner of the station of Communist affiliation during the 
hearings in September 1954 later recanted and charged that they had been "brainwashed" 
and coerced into giving false testimony by the government lawyers. On March 7, 1955, 
a nine-count indictment for perjury was brought against one of the witnesses, Mrs. Marie 
Natvig, charging that her recantation was false. The other witness, like Matusow who was 
also a government witness in this same hearing, has not yet been indicted. N.Y. TxMEs, 
city ed., March 8, 1955, p.12. 
7 Wharton gives the common law definition of perjury as "the wilful assertion as 
to a matter of fact, opinion, belief, or knowledge, made by a witness in a judicial proceed-
ing as part of his evidence, either upon oath or in any form allowed by law to be substi-
tuted for an oath, whether such evidence is given in open court, or in affidavit, or other-
wise, such assertion being known to such witness to be false, and being intended by him 
to mislead the court, jury, or person holding the proceeding." 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL 
LAw, 12th ed., §1510, p. 1780 (1932). 
8 "Whoever, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in 
any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that 
he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, 
deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath 
states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of 
perjury •... " 18 u.s.c. (1952) §1621. 
9Bijur v. Bendix, (D.C. Cir. 1923) 285 F. 974; People v. Gillette, 111 N.Y.S. 133 
(1908); Brannen v. State, 94 Fla. 656, 114 S. 429 (1927). Contra, United States v. 
Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 57 S. Ct. 535 (1937), where testimony before a congressional com-
mittee was corrected the follo,ving day. 
10 For general discussion of this problem and collection of cases, see 23 VA. L. R.Bv. 
947 (1937); 8 lNrn.A. L. R.Bv. (N.Y.U.) 193 (1953). 
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Amendment.11 Yet even with all the substantive elements present, 
the Justice Department might still have trouble in gaining a convic-
tion because of the technicalities in drawing the indictment and the 
requirements of proof under present federal law. These procedural 
difficulties and the policies behind them will be examined herein, and 
the relation of perjury to contempt will be noted. Finally, corrective 
legislation which has recently been proposed by the attorney general 
will be considered. 
I. The Indictment 
The first problem that the prosecution must face is drawing the 
indictment. Assuming that there have been two contradictory state-
ments under oath and nothing more, it is almost impossible for the 
prosecution to form an indictment that will withstand objection under 
present federal law. Of the several possible alternatives, each has 
its pitfalls. First, both acts of swearing, though they occurred at dif-
ferent times, might conceivably be joined in a single count. But dis-
junctive charges-such as either the defendant lied on the :first occasion 
or the second-are clearly objectionable.12 On the other hand, if the 
acts are not pleaded disjunctively, the count could be stricken either for 
repugnancy13 or duplicity1 4 in including two separate offenses. A 
second possibility would be to join the two acts in two separate counts 
without stating which assertions were false. 
It was recognized early in the federal courts that where the same 
person or persons are charged, several offenses could be joined in 
separate counts even though the offenses were committed at different 
11 Immunity which must be accorded to a witness compelled to give evidence against 
himself relates only to past offenses, and therefore does not exempt the witness from 
prosecution for perjury committed when so testifying. Glickstein v. United States, 222 
U.S. 139, 32 S.Ct. 71 (1911). 
12 The alternative may be used in civil cases [Rule 8(e)2, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 
28 U.S.C. (1952)] but not in criminal practice. United States v. Buckner, (2d Cir. 1941) 
118 F. (2d) 468. 
13 If both statements were asserted as false, there would be an obvious contradiction 
in a material allegation of the indictment, the very essence of repugnancy. Sunderland v. 
United States, (8th Cir. 1927) 19 F. (2d) 202. 
14 Duplicity is the joinder of two or more distinct offenses in one count. Bratton v. 
United States, (10th Cir. 1934) 73 F. (2d) 795. The test in determining whether more 
than one offense is charged is: does each proposed offense require proof of some fact which 
the others do not? Dimenza v. Johnston, (9th Cir. 1942) 130 F. (2d) 465, reh. den. 
131 F. (2d) 47 (1942). Defendant could logically argne that to convict on either of the 
two statements requires facts, such as time, oath, tribunal, which are different from the 
other and therefore separate offenses are charged. 
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times.15 This would also seem to follow under the Court Rules of 
1946.16 But it has been determined both before17 and after18 the new 
court rules went into effect that each count is regarded as if it were 
a separate indictment and must be sufficient in itself. It must stand 
or fall upon its own allegations without reference to other counts not 
expressly incorporated therein. This,. of course, is fatal in the case of 
contradictory statements, for neither statement will stand alone as 
a charge of perjury unless the prosecution can say that it was in that 
instance that the witness violated his oath. The obvious way around 
these difficulties is for the prosecution to name in the indictment the 
occasion when the accused has lied and use the other contradictory 
statement simply as evidence. This would appear particularly easy 
in a situation such as Matusow's where the accused has expressly ad-
mitted that he lied in his first testimony. This solution, however, 
has been tried on numerous occasiop.s and raises a serious problem 
of evidence. 
II. The Problem of Evidence 
Perjury is one of the few crimes that require more than mere proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. A certain quantitative standard must also 
be met. The rule generally stated is: direct testimony by two inde-
pendent witnesses, or one witness and corroborating circumstances, 
are necessary to sustain a conviction.19 Wigmore points out that this 
requirement is based both on historical and poHcy considerations.20 
Until the middle of the 17th century, the crime of perjury was dealt 
with almost exclusively by the Court of Star Chamber, which followed 
the ecclesiastical or numerical system of proof. This meant that facts 
were determined by counting the number of oaths in support or against 
the fact in question rather than by the quality or persuasiveness of 
the testimony. The idea of a quantitative basis of proof therefore 
already had a strong tradition when the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Star Chamber was transferred to the common law courts. This tradi-
15 United States v. Wentworth & O'Neil, (C.C. N.H. 1882) 11 F. 52; United States 
v. Nye, (C.C. Ohio 1880) 4 F. 888. 
16 "Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in 
a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors 
or both, are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction •••• " 
Rule 8(a), Fed. Rules Crim. Proc., 18 U.S.C. (1952) §3771. 
17 McClintock v. United States, (10th Cir. 1932) 60 F. (2d) 839; Hood v. United 
States, (10th Cir. 1930) 43 F. (2d) 353. 
lBWalker v. United States, (9th Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 796. 
19 State v. Heed, 57 Mo. 252 (1874); Williams v. Commonwealth, 91 Pa. St. 493 
(1879); United States v. Wood, 14 Pet. (39 U.S.) 430 (1840). 
20 7 WIGMORE, EvmBNcB, 3d ed., §2040, p. 273 (1940). 
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tion was further supported by the fact that when the common law 
courts first took jurisdiction over the crime of perjury, it was the rule in 
all other criminal cases that the accused could not testify. Thus on 
a quantitative basis, one witness for the prosecution was in a sense 
something as against nothing. But in the case of perjury the de-
fendant' s oath was in effect always in evidence, and if only one witness 
was offered against him, the result was simply oath against oath. Hence 
the general rule of the early common law was that direct testimony 
by two witnesses, instead of the usual one, was necessary to convict 
for perjury. When (I) the accused was everywhern permitted to 
take the stand in his own defense, and (2) the value of an oath per se 
lost its significance, these reasons for making perjury an exception to 
the normal rules of evidence became indefensible. However, other 
policy considerations were found so that at least one witness and cor-
roborative circumstances are still generally required. Some felt that 
because of the enormity of the crime, and its so-called unnatural and 
heinous character, perjury, like treason, should demand safeguards in 
addition to the usual standard of proof.21 Others justified this ex-
ception on the grounds that a less stringent standard would increase 
the likelihood of false accusations of perjury by defeated litigants seek-
ing revenge, and this way witnesses would be discouraged from taking 
the stand.22 Because these historical and policy considerations have 
lost a great deal of force through the years,23 some states have 
permitted circumstantial evidence alone to convict.24 A few jurisdic-
tions have even abandoned the quantitative theory of evidence al-
together.25 Yet it is still generally accepted doctrine in the majority 
21 State v. Courtright, 66 Ohio St. 35, 63 N.E. 590 (1902). 
22 Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 65 S.Ct. 548 (1945); BEsT, EVIDENCE, 
3d Am. ed., §606, p. 558 (1908). 
23 'We find ourselves unable to approve the doctrine that perjmy is a more heinous 
crime than murder, or that one charged with perjmy should have greater immunity than 
one charged with murder." State v. Storey, 148 Minn. 398 at 403, 182 N.W. 613 (1921). 
24 For collection of cases see 15 A.L.R. 634 (1921); 27 A.L.R. 857 (1923), 42 A.L.R. 
1063 (1926). Many of the cases cited in these annotations can be read so as to allow 
circumstantial evidence only in exceptional situations, such as where the only party who 
could give direct testimony was deceased, Marvel v. State, 3 Harr. (33 Del.) 110, 131 A. 
317 (1925), where the false oath involves a state of mind or belief which is incapable 
of direct and positive proof by a living witness other than the accused himself, People v. 
Doody, 172 N.Y. 165, 64 N.E. 807 (1902), or where the accused is supported only by a 
presumption of innocence, State v. Cerfoglio, 46 Nev. 332, 213 P. 102 (1923). None-
theless, these cases represent a strong minority trend away from the standard rule of two 
witnesses or one witness and corroborating circumstances. 
25 Ariz. Code Ann. (Supp. 1954) §43-420l(c); State v. Storey, 148 Minn. 398, 182 
N.W. 613 (1921). 
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of American jurisdictions that direct testimony by two witnesses or 
by one witness plus corroborating circumstances are necessary to sus-
tain a conviction for perjury. 
Applying this general rule to the situation of contradictory oaths, or 
where the accused has directly contradicted sworn testimony by docu-
mentary evidence of his own making,26 such as business records,27 the 
accused is in a sense a witness against himself; hence, another witness 
or corroborative circumstances are all that are required. In speaking 
of an "oath against an oath" in this instance, it is merely the accused's 
oath that is ip question. There is no occasion for concern over the 
need for protection against the unsuppor~ed oath of another or the 
possible vengeance of a defeated litigant. Yet the courts have continued 
almost universally to require corroborating circumstances on the ground 
that it is impossible to tell when the witness is telling the truth and 
when he is lying.28 Even when he swears under oath that his previous 
testimony was perjurious, as in the Matusow case, he could just as 
well be lying under the second oath as under the £.rst, and additional 
corroborating circumstances are still necessary to prove which one is 
false.29 Only when the accused takes the stand in his own defense and 
admits that he violated his oath on the particular occasion charged is 
the rule dispensed with.30 Under this principle the coincidence that 
any number of people may have heard Matusow testify at the original 
Jencks or Flynn trials is immaterial because the corroboration must go 
to the falsity of the testimony.31 It must be evidence aliunde defend-
ant's testimony showing in which instance he lied.32 As to what 
form the corroborating circumstances may take, it is almost impossible 
2s United States v. Wood, 14 Pet. (39 U.S.) 430 (1840). 
27 United States v. Mayer, (D.C. Ore. 1865) 26 Fed. Cas. 1225, No. 15,753; Jacobs 
v. United States, (6th Cir. 1929) 31 F. (2d) 568. 
28 People v. McClintic, 193 Mich. 589, 160 N.W. 461 (1916); Blakemore v. State, 
39 Okla. Cr. 355, 265 P. 152 (1928); Paytes v. State, 137 Tenn. 129, 191 S.W. 975 
(1917); Billingsley v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 620, 95 S.W. 520 (1906). 
29 An early New York case, People v. Burden, 9 Barb. (N.Y.) 467 (1850), hela that 
an express admission, under oath, of corruptly falsifying previous testimony was sufficient 
in itself to indicate that perjury had been committed on the first occasion. This line of 
reasoning was also followed in Behrle v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1938) 100 F. (2d) 714. 
But the majority position is clearly the other way. 25 A.L.R. 416 (1923). For criticism 
of the Burden case, see Schwartz v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. 1025 (1876); State v. Burns, 
120 S.C. 523, 113 S.E. 351 (1922); McWhorter v. United States, (5th Cir. 1952) 193 
F. (2d) 982. 
30 If the accused takes the stand in his own defense, an admission of perjury on the 
occasion charged in the indictment is deemed tantamount' to a plea of guilty. United 
States v. Buckner, (2d Cir. 1941) 118 F. (2d) 468. 
31 7 WIGMORB, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2042, p. 280 (1940). 
32 McWhorter v. United States, (5th Cir. 1952) 193 F. (2d) 982. 
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to lay down any .fixed rule. 33 It has been held that a mere failure to 
deny the charge of perjury34 or the accused's own mannerisms and 
conduct on the witness stand may be enough.35 Or the corroboration 
may simply go to show motive or design.36 Thus any evidence which 
convinces the jury beyond a reasonable doubt as to the occasion upon 
which the oath was violated would seem to be sufficient.37 
Drawing the indictment and finding sufficient corroborative evi-
dence are therefore the two major hurdles facing the prosecution in 
the case of contradictory statements under oath. These two procedural 
difficulties are in essence opposite sides of the same coin. Both rest 
on the fact that the prosecution must show on which occasion the 
accused has committed perjury. Few courts, however, stop to explain 
what difference it should make that the time is unknown. That the 
crime has been committed is not in the slightest doubt. Is there any-
thing wrong with the disjunctive?38 The most common argument 
against its use is that of "indefiniteness" or "uncertainty."30 The 
uncertainty in the case of contradictory oaths, however, does not place 
an unreasonable burden on the defendant such as might arise in other 
situations, e.g., an alternative charge of assault or battery. Here only 
a single crime is charged, with the time left open. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court has expressly held that this is all the notice to which 
the accused is entitled.40 A second objection that is sometimes given 
against the disjunctive is that by denying one count the accused is 
forced to admit his guilt on the other.41 Though in many situations 
33 For collection of cases where various forms of circumstantial evidence have been 
used for corroboration, see 111 A.L.R. 825 (1937). 
34 People v. Todd, 9 Cal. App. (2d) 237, 49 P. (2d) 611 (1935), where accused 
tried to avoid the element of criminal intent by claiming her false statements were a 
mistake. 
35 State v. Miller, 24 W.Va. 802 (1884). 
36 Ibid. 
37 Sometimes it is said that the evidence must be "strongly" corroborative, United 
States v. Hall, (D.C. Ga. 1890) 44 F. 864, or that it must be strong enough to overcome 
the oath of the defendant and the legal presumption of his innocence. State v. Smails, 
63 Wash. 172, 115 P. 82 (1911). But where the defendant has as much as admitted 
his guilt and it is only his own oath that is in question, these cases would not be in point. 
The only logical standard would be that amount of evidence which is necessary to con-
vince the jury as to which time the witness lied. Some courts leave the amount of cor-
roboration entirely to the jury even where contradictory oaths are not involved. Parham 
v. State, 3 Ga. App. 468, 60 S.E. 123 (1908). 
38 For a general discussion of alternative pleading, see Hankin, "Alternative and 
Hypothetical Pleadings," 33 YALE L.J. 365 (1924) .. 
39 Ibid. 
40 State v. Ellenstein, 121 N.J.L. 304, 2 A. (2d) 454 (1938), where a statute 
permitting use of the alternative in case of contradictory statements under oath was upheld. 
412 RossBLL, Cm.MEs AND MisnEMEANons, 6th Am. ed., §652, note (a) (1850); 
Hankin, "Alternative and Hypothetical Pleadings," 33 YALE L.J. 365 (1924). 
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such a result would be highly unjust, in the case of contradictory state-
ments this is the exact position that the accused has placed himself 
in whether the disjunctive is used or not. Without it his defense can 
only be: "I did not commit perjury on the occasion charged, but I 
did on the other occasion."42 Paradoxically, the accused is forced to 
use perjury as a defense to perjury in any event, so this line of reason-
ing is hardly adequate ground to deny the use of the disjunctive in the 
case of contradictory statements. It might also be argued that by the 
use of the alternative the jury could find the accused guilty without 
actually coming to a unanimous verdict. Conceivably, part of the 
jury might think that the defendant was lying on one occasion and 
the rest of the jury find him guilty because they thought he was lying 
on the other. Even so, there is no injustice inasmuch as the whole jury 
would concur that the accused has committed perjury. The reasons 
usually put forth against the disjunctive therefore lose their persuasive-
ness when applied to the case of contradictory statements under oath. 
Correspondingly, the grounds for the requirement of corroborating 
circumstances become meaningless. Nonetheless, the rule still stands 
in the majority of American jurisdictions. 
III. Perjury as Grounds for Contempt 
In some instances these technical difficulties may be circumvented 
through the courts' summary power of contempt. The power of the 
federal courts to punish those acts tending to "obstruct the administra-
tion of justice" is stated° in section 401 of the Criminal Code,45 and, 
following the lead of the early bankruptcy cases, it is now generally 
recognized that in some circumstances perjury may constitute such 
an obstruction.44 On the surface it might seem that every instance of 
perjury is an obstruction to the administration of justice insofar as our 
system of justice is dependent upon truthful evidence. Though some 
of the early cases used this approach,45 the federal courts generally have 
been reluctant to go that far for fear that contempt would become a 
mere punishment for perjury without giving the accused his right to 
trial by jury,46 or a "legal thumbscrew" to exact testimony as the judge 
42 It is assumed that all the other elements of perjury are present except the .fact of 
falsity. 
43 18 u.s.c. (1952) §401(1). 
44 For general discussion and collection of cases, see 11 A.L.R. 342 (1921). 
45 Chicago Directory Co. v. United States Directory Co., (C.C. N.Y. 1903) 123 
F. 194; In re Uhner, (C.C. Ohio 1913) 208 F. 461. 
46 In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 66 S.Ct. 78 (1945). 
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sees fit.47 Thus, in the leading case of Ex parte Hudgings48 it was 
decided that perjury is contumaceous only when it is procedurally 
obstructive so as to impede the mechanical functions of the court. 
Perjury merely tending to deceive is not sufficient.49 It must in some 
way block the actual inquiry of the court, such as perjury by a juror 
on voir dire50 or evasive and false testimony by a witness which is of 
such a nature as to thwart the whole trial.51 Applying this standard 
to the hearing for a new trial in the Jencks case, there is considerable 
doubt whether Matusow' s testimony actually impeded the administra-
tion of justice. It could be argued that his testimony simply misled 
the court or, at most, caused additional proceedings, which in effect 
is not different from any other act of perjury. The actual inquiry of 
the court in the procedural sense of the word has not been blocked. 
Could this be an instance, as several writers have suggested, where the 
summary power of contempt is used merely as a punishment for per-
jury?52 
In sentencing Matusow for contempt, Judge Thomason concluded 
that Matusow' s recantation was false and his testimony in the hearing 
for a new trial in Jencks case was motivated simply by a desire to pub-
licize his book, False Witness.53 This broad finding of fact raises an 
interesting question of evidence. The rule followed in many of the 
states is that there cannot be an obstruction of justice unless the falsity 
47 Nelles, "Summary Power to Punish For Contempt," 31 CoL. L. REv. 956 at 969 
(1931). 
4s 249 U.S. 378, 39 S.Ct. 337 (1919). 
49 United States v. Arbuckle, (D.C. D.C. 1943) 48 F. Supp. 537. 
50 Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 53 S.Ct. 465 (1933). 
51 United States v. Appel, (D.C. N.Y. 1913) 211 F. 495; United States v. McGovern, 
(2d Cir. 1932) 60 F. (2d) 880. 
52 7 VAND. L. REv. 272 (1954); 21 CALIF. L. REv. 582 (1933); 18 So. CAL. L. 
REv. 284 (1945); McClintock, "What Happens To Perjurers," 24 MINN. L. REv. 727 
(1940). 
53 "I am firmly convinced from the evidence of the witness, including that of Matu-
sow, not only that the evidence offered, in support of the motion, is not worthy of belief, 
but that Matusow, alone or with others, wilfully and nefariously and for the purpose of 
defrauding this Court and subverting the true course of the administration of justice and 
obstructing justice, schemed to and actually used this Court of law as a forum for the 
purpose of calling public attention to a book, purportedly written by Matusow, entitled 
'False Witness.' This Court finds the fact to be that as early as September 21, 1954, 
responsible officials of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, under 
the guise of seeking evidence in Jencks' behalf, subsidized the writing and publication of 
this book by authorizing the expenditure of Union funds for that purpose. This at a 
time when, from the evidence, Matusow had no intention of writing any such book as 
was here exhibited or of changing his testimony given in the Jencks trial. I find that this 
subsidization was deliberately done the more easily to persuade Matusow to lend himself 
to the perpetration of a fraud on this court by means of the filing of his recanting affidavit 
and his testimony given herein. I find that Matusow wilfully and with full knowledge of 
the consequences, lent himself to this evil scheme for money and for notoriety.'' United 
States v. Matusow, (D.C. Tex. 1955) Crim. No. 60393. 
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of the oath is within the judicial knowledge of the court.54 By requiring 
the equivalent of judicial notice, the falsity of the oath must either be 
admitted55 or clearly beyond question.56 If it is denied or the facts 
are in dispute, the matter is generally deemed a question for the jury.57 
If, as several writers have suggested,68 the same standard is also re-
quired in the federal courts, Matusow might be able to attack the 
findings of Judge Thomason unless the record clearly shows that there 
can be no dispute as to the occasion on which he lied.59 On th~ other 
hand, at least two federal cases have expressly stated that proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt is all that is needed,00 suggesting that perjury should 
be treated the same as any other form of contempt.61 In the majority 
of federal cases this question of what standard of evidence is required 
where perjury may be grounds for contempt is avoided by deciding 
the case on the issue of obstructing the administration of justice. In 
all likelihood the same procedure will be followed in the Matusow case. 
Regardless of what standard is followed, this much is certain: 
enough evidence was available in the Jencks hearing to convince Judge 
Thomason that Matusow' s recantation was false. If the proof was 
sufficient for that judge, might not this same evidence be sufficient 
corroboration to convince a jury and sustain a conviction for perjury? 
IV. Proposed Legislation 
Amending legislation is the only feasible way to meet the problem 
of contradictory statements under oath while preserving the offender's 
constitutional right to trial by jury. There is ample cause for special 
legislation to cover this unique situation without modifying the whole 
law of perjury, and at least ten states have so recognized by enacting 
54 Ex parte Blache, 40 Cal. App. (2d) 687, 105 P. (2d) 635 (1940); People v. 
Tomlinson, 296 ill. App. 609, 16 N.E. (2d) 940 (1938); Riley v. Wallace, 188 Ky. 
471, 222 S.W. 1085 (1920); State v. Illario, 10 N.J. Super. 475, 77 A. (2d) 483 (1950). 
55 In re Caruba, 140 N.J. Eq. 563, 55 A. (2d) 289 (1947); People v. Freeman, 256 
III. App. 233 (1930). 
56 Thus, judicial knowledge has been found where affidavits by a party set up con-
llicting sets of facts in the same proceeding. Sachs v. High Clothing Co., 90 N.J. Eq. 545, 
108 A. 58 (1919). See also Blankenburg v. Commonwealth, 272 Mass. 25, 172 N.E. 209 
(1930), where uncontrovertible documentary evidence was available. 
57Edwards v. Edwards, 87 N.J. Eq. 546, 100 A. 608 (1917). 
587 VAND. L. R:Bv. 272 (1954); 21 CALIF. L. R:Bv. 582 (1933). 
59 If the contradictory statements are in the same proceeding, the judge does not have 
to know which one is false. In re Bronstein, (D.C. N.Y. 1910) 182 F. 349; In re Feller-
man, (D.C. N.Y. 1906) 149 F. 244. But where the contradictory statements are not in 
the same proceeding, as in the Matusow case, the witness would only be obstructing 
justice in that proceeding where his testimony is falsely given. 
oo In re Meckley, (3d Cir. 1943) 137 F. (2d) 310, cert. den. 320 U.S. 760, 64 S.Ct. 
69 (1943); Jones v. United States, (7th Cir. 1913) 209 F. 585. 
01 Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 31 S.Ct. 492 (1911). 
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modifications of one form or another.62 The Arizona statute,63 for 
instance, simply provides that one who makes contradictory statements 
under oath is guilty of perjury, and the prosecution need not show 
which one was true or false. The accused is also permitted to assert 
as an affirmative defense that at the time he made each statement he 
believed it to be true. Though there have been no cases as yet to 
interpret this type of statute, it appears to shift the burden of proof 
from the prosecution to the defendant, and may be objectionable on 
this ground. Under the Illinois-type statute,64 on the other hand, 
contradictory statements constitute only a presumption of falsity in 
favor of the prosecution. Thus the accused has the burden of going 
forward with the evidence, but the ultimate burden of persuasion re-
mains on the prosecution. New York provides for a combination of 
these two types by making conflicting oaths a presumption of falsity 
for first degree perjury and the equivalence of perjury for second de-
grees of the offense where materiality is no longer required. 65 T ennes-
see appears to require the prosecution to set forth one statement in the 
indictment as being the false one, but then aids the prosecution with 
a presumption of falsity when the contrary statement is brought in as 
evidence. 66 All these statutes, either expressly or by implication, do 
away with the corroborative evidence rule, and most67 would appear 
to permit disjunctive indictments. 
In an attempt to keep in step with this corrective legislation, the 
attorney general last year proposed to the 83d Congress that a change 
be effected in the Federal Criminal Code, but nothing to that end was 
accomplished. Following the Matusow incident, there was proposed 
a second and broader amendment68 which is now pending in both the 
House and Senate.69 This new section 1263 would read: 
62 Ariz. Code Ann. (Supp. 1954) §§43-4201(a) and (c); Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) 
§41-3008; Cal. Penal Code (Deering, 1949) §118(a) (prima facie evidence of falsity 
where testimony contradicts prior affidavits); ill. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935; Supp. 
1954) c. 38, §475; La Rev. Stat. (1950) tit. 14, §124 (perjury), §126 (false swearing); 
Md. Code Ann. (Flack, 1951) art. 27, §533; 2-A N.J. Stat. Ann. (1953) §§131-5, 131-6; 
N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1944) §l627(a); Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) 
§11077; Utah Code Ann. (1953) tit. 76, §§76-45-11, 76-45-12. 
63 Ariz. Code Ann. (Supp. 1954) §43-4201(a). 
64 ill. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935; Supp. 1954) c. 38, §475. For interpretation 
of this provision see 44 ILL. L. REv. 112 (1949); 39 J. CRIM. L. AND CmM. 629 (1949). 
65 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1944) §§1627, 1627(a). 
66Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) §11077. 
67 Tennessee excepted. 
68 The amendment suggested last year did not include testimony before either House 
of Congress or congressional committees. A bill similar in text, H.R. 799, was also 
introduced in the 84th Congress by Congressman Keating and is now pending before the 
House Committee on the Judiciary. 
69 S. 1554 was introduced by Senator Wiley on March 28, 1954. An identical bill, 
H.R. 5264, was introduced in the House on the same day by Congressman Reed. 
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'Whoever willfully makes oath or affirmation to a statement 
on a material matter before a grand jury, during the trial of a case, 
or before either House of Congress or a congressional committee 
or subcommittee, and does within any three-year period willfully 
make oath or affirmation to a contradictory statement on a material 
matter before a grand jury, during the trial of a case, or before 
either House of Congress or a congressional committee or sub-
committee, is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished as provided 
in section 1721. Such perjury may be established by proof of 
the willful making of such contradictory statements without 
alleging or proving which one thereof is false." 
In covering only proceedings before grand juries, courts, or con-
gressional bodies, this amendment is narrower than many of the 
statutes already enacted.70 It avoids the pitfall of shifting the general 
burden of persuasion to the accused, for the government must still 
prove materiality, willfulness, and the oath before the proper tribunal. 
The effect is simply to remove the burden of proving which of the 
two statements is false when of necessity one of them must be so. 
The proposed change might be challenged, however, on the ground 
that technically it is possible to trap the innocent along with the guilty. 
The word "willfully" would probably protect most of the innocent 
contradictory slips that an honest, but nervous, witness might make. 
Yet if the witness should "willfully" make contradictory statements and 
each time believe they are true, he would still fall within the literal 
wording of the statute. This could be avoided by expressly providing 
that belief in the truth of the statements when made is an affirmative 
defense.71 If the proposed section is not so amended, it is likely the 
courts will construe it to mean that proof of belief in the truth of the 
statement is a negation of willfullness. Such an interpretation would 
leave the ultimate burden of proof on the prosecution. Yet even if 
this belief were made an affirmative defense by statute, so as to shift 
the burden of persuasion, the end to be gained far outweighs the added 
burden placed on the honest witness in this one situation. 
V. Conclusion 
It is impossible to draw a definite conclusion on the particular 
facts of the Matusow case. Any number of factors could be influenc-
70 Most of the statutes cover any contradictory statements under oath without limita-
tion as to the type of tribunal before which they were made. See the Arizona, Arkansas, 
illinois, and New Jersey statutes cited, in note 62 supra. 
71 See Ariz. Code Ann. (Supp. 1954) §43-4201(a); La. Rev. Stat. (1950) tit. 14, 
§§124, 126. 
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ing the Justice Department to withhold a perjury indictment. This 
incident has served, however, to focus attention on some of the prob-
lems involved, and solutions possible, in the usual case of contradictory 
statements. As long as the corroborative evidence requirement and the 
rule against the use of the disjunctive remain in the law, and the ac-
cused has given contradictory statements and nothing more, the prose-
cution is stymied. It seems highly unjust that a person, guilty by his 
own admission, should be allowed to take cover behind procedural 
technicalities which no longer have support in sound policy. Amenda-
tory legislation will cut down the incentive for recantation. It might 
also be argued that punishment here is repugnant to the fundamental 
tenets of Christianity, the original source of testimony under oath, 
insofar as that religion encourages repentance. It cannot be denied 
that there are policy and moral arguments against this type of legisla-
tion. On the other hand, there is also the practical necessity of dis-
couraging others from violating their oaths. Is there any reason why 
the perjurer who recants should be given any different treatment than 
the murderer who subsequently confesses his crime? In both in-
stances the crime against society is complete and the offender should 
be made to answer for his misdeed if for no other reason than to pre-
vent others from following in his path. Recantation, therefore, might 
be a mitigating factor in weighing the punishment, but should not 
result in complete absolution. Moreover, where, as in at least two 
cases within recent months,72 there is reason to believe the recantation 
itself is false, the need for corrective measures appears even stronger. 
It has been estimated that on a national scale perjury is committed in 
as many as 75 percent of the criminal cases coming before the courts.73 
Of course, the best answer to this problem would be a closer screening 
of witnesses by counsel before they even reach the court or committee 
room. But until the proper persons are willing to assume this re-
sponsibility for themselves, there is a need for legislation. The pro-
posed amendment offers one step in the right direction. 
Richard 1\1. Adams, S. Ed. 
72 The Matusow case and the indictment against Mrs. Marie Natvig. See note 6 supra. 
73 Hibschman, "'You Do Solemnly Swear!' Or That Perjury Problem," 24 J. CRIM. 
L. AND CRIM. 901 (1934). 
